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Tug-of-war over EU’s policy 
towards its neighbours
Szymon Ananicz
The revolutions in North Africa, the approaching end of the ‘strategic re-
view’ of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) initiated by the Europe-
an Commission, and the beginning of negotiations on the European Union’s 
new financial perspective, have intensified the debate among the member 
states and EU institutions on what policy the EU will adopt towards its 
neighbourhood in the future. The discussion concerns not only the shape 
of the ENP but also non-ENPI foreign policy instruments which Brussels 
applies towards neighbouring countries, such as the thematic instruments 
and loan support. 
Serious differences of opinion have emerged among the member states. 
The countries located in the southern part of the EU want Brussels to 
boost its policy towards North Africa, even at the expense of engagement 
in Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus. Meanwhile Central Eu-
ropean countries, including Germany, favour a more balanced approach 
towards both directions. 
The future shape of the ENP, as well as the EU’s other foreign policy instru-
ments, will have a strong impact on the approach the EU adopts towards 
its Eastern neighbourhood. If some of the proposals are realised, especially 
the southern member states’ request to transfer some of the funds from 
the Eastern to the Southern neighbourhood, the chances of meeting the 
Eastern Partnership goals, such as the association of the partner countries 
with the EU and the creation of deep and comprehensive free trade areas, 
could be reduced. 
Conditions affecting the debate 
on the future of the neighbourhood policy
The overthrow of the regimes in Egypt and Tunisia, and the present uprising against Mu-
ammar Gaddafi’s rule in Libya, have called into question the guidelines of the EU’s past 
policy toward its Southern neighbourhood. Recent events have made it clear that placing 
a higher priority on the stabilisation of the region than on its democratisation, and de facto 
supporting the authoritarian regimes in North Africa, has contributed neither to stabilisation 
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nor democratisation in those countries. What it has contributed to is the reinforcement of 
the negative image of the EU among the North African societies, who see it as an ally of the 
overthrown regimes, in which the former colonial powers have the biggest say. 
In parallel to the events in Africa, a revision of the European Neighbourhood Policy is 
taking place. The ENP is the EU’s key policy instrument towards all its neighbours in the 
Mediterranean Sea basin, Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus (except for Russia). 
The revision started in summer 2010, when the European Commissioner for Enlargement 
and the European Neighbourhood Policy, Štefan Füle, and the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, asked the member states 
and the EU neighbours to present their visions for a more effective neighbourhood policy. 
The culmination of the revision process will take place on 20 April 2011 with the announ-
cement of the European Commission’s communiqué outlining a new policy towards the EU’s 
neighbourhood, and the Council’s adoption of that communiqué. Work on the new con-
cept was initiated by the European Com-
mission; however, the European External 
Action Service (EEAS), which was created 
on 1 December 2010, has taken over the 
supervision of the ENP’s implementation. 
Thus, it is likely that the EEAS will have 
a strong influence on the final version of 
the communiqué. 
The ENP is not the only instrument who-
se application the member states would 
like to change. Some countries have also 
suggested revising the Instrument for Stability, the European Instrument for Democracy 
and Human Rights, and the Development Co-operation Instrument (none of which are part 
of the ENP), or the mandate for the European Investment Bank’s operations in the EU’s 
neighbourhood. 
The events in Africa and the reform of the EU’s foreign policy also coincide with the begin-
ning of talks regarding a new financial perspective for 2014–2020. Thus, the EU member 
states and institutions want their suggestions concerning the form of the EU’s foreign policy 
to be reflected in the European Union’s new budget. 
At the same time, a discussion on the EU’s immediate reaction to the destabilisation 
in North Africa is taking place. It has been suggested, for example, that it should offer 
assistance in holding democratic elections in Egypt and Tunisia and send a civilian or even 
military mission to Libya. This has focused the EU’s attention on the Southern neighbour-
hood at the expense of the Eastern Partnership. 
The Southern member states’ offensive
The recent events in North Africa have encouraged some southern EU member states 
to launch a diplomatic offensive aimed at reinforcing the southern dimension of the EU’s 
foreign policy. These countries are particularly interested in the EU’s involvement in brin-
ging stability to North Africa, since it is they who are most exposed to the threats coming 
from this area, including the mass influx of refugees and illegal immigration. Furthermore, 
the support those countries (mainly France and Italy) had long offered to the regimes 
in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt has discredited them in the eyes of the North African societies. 
Since the southern member states have lost their own influence and reliability in the region, 
they are now keen on taking greater advantage of EU’s foreign policy toolbox. 
ENP is not the only tool whose appli-
cation the member states would like to 
change. Some countries have also sug-
gested revising the so-called thematic 
instruments, which are not part of the 
ENP, or the mandate for the European 
Investment Bank’s operations in the 
EU’s neighbourhood. 
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1  This letter is available on the 
website of the French Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs: 
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/
fr/IMG/pdf/Lettre_a_Mme_Ash-
ton.pdf, and the non-paper 
is published on the website: 
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/
fr/IMG/pdf/11-02-17_Non-pa-
pier_Action_de_l_Union_europe-
enne_en_direction_du_voisina-
ge_Sud.pdf
2  Article by Italy’s Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Franco Frattini, 
‘A European plan for Mediterra-
nean stability’, Financial Times, 
18 February 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3  Westerwelle: 'Zusagen für Nor-
dafrika an Reformen knüpfen’, 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
18 February 2011,  
http://www.faz.net/s/
RubA24ECD630CA-
E40E483841DB7D16F4211/
Doc~EB11533A-
88D2E4200B32B03E-
0A2326BE4~ATpl~ 
Ecommon~Scontent.html
The stance of the southern member states was presented in a letter and a non-paper ad-
dressed on 16 February by the foreign ministers of France, Spain, Greece, Cyprus, Slovenia 
and Malta to Catherine Ashton1. They appealed for the strengthening of the southern di-
mension of the EU’s foreign policy in order to provide adequate support to the North African 
countries in the process of their transformation. They put forward proposals for modifying 
a broad range of EU’s foreign policy instruments: the European Neighbourhood Policy, the 
so-called thematic programmes (including 
the Instrument for Stability, the Europe-
an Instrument for Democracy and Human 
Rights, and the Development Co-opera-
tion Instrument), part of the EU’s external 
relations budget line, as well as lending of 
the European Investment Bank (EIB) and 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD). The letter’s authors 
suggest the creation of a macro-regional 
strategy in the Mediterranean, modelled 
on the strategies for the Baltic Sea and the Danube. This could mean that part of the EU’s 
structural funds would be made available to those countries. Another instrument they would 
like reinforced is the Union for the Mediterranean. Although the EU’s policy towards the 
Eastern neighbourhood is not the subject of this letter, its authors suggest that the Euro-
pean Union has focused excessively on the Eastern direction and neglected the Southern 
one, and this ‘imbalance’ should now be removed, partly by transferring some of the funds 
allocated from the Eastern to the Southern neighbourhood.
It seems that the letter’s authors can expect support from Italy. Although Rome has not 
joined the initiative, Italy’s foreign minister Franco Frattini has suggested offering North 
Africa aid which would be the “equivalent of the Marshall Plan”2. Portugal may also join 
this group of countries.
The Central European point of view
The proposals put forward by the South have met with objection from the Central Euro-
pean members states of the EU. Germany opposes increasing the ENP budget and wants 
to balance the Southern and the Eastern dimensions of the EU neighbourhood without 
discriminating in favour of any of those. 
Berlin’s stance on this issue was presen-
ted by Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle 
in a letter to Catherine Ashton, which was 
sent before the meeting of the Foreign 
Affairs Council on 21 February3. Germany 
has proposed making any financial assi-
stance conditional on progress in demo-
cratisation, respecting human rights and 
adopting rule-of-law standards. Those 
neighbour countries which show commit-
ment to implementing reforms and inte-
gration with the EU should receive more funds. According to press reports, Germany has 
also suggested that the model used so far, in which a certain amount of funds is allocated 
to a given country as part of a seven-year financial perspective, should no longer apply. 
Instead, only half of the funds should be allocated for aid to a given country according to 
Although the EU’s policy towards 
the Eastern neighbourhood is not 
the subject of the letter, its authors 
suggest that the European Union has 
focused excessively on the Eastern 
direction and neglected the Southern 
one, and that this ‘imbalance’ 
should now be removed. 
The proposals put forward by the 
southern EU countries have met with 
objections from the EU’s Central 
European member states. Germany 
opposes increasing the ENP budget and 
wants to balance the Southern and the 
Eastern dimensions of the EU neighbo-
urhood, without discriminating in favour 
of any of them. 
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4 Europolitics, 
21 February 2011
 
 
 
 
5 Europolitics, 
22 February 2011.
the present rules, while the rest of the money would be made available depending on how 
concrete reforms are implemented. The EU should limit direct budget support to those ENP 
countries which make little progress, and instead focus more on increasing capabilities 
of state administration, the judiciary and the parliaments. Germany also wants European 
universities to accept more students from the Southern neighbour countries, enhance co-
operation between universities and offer greater opportunities for legal immigration from 
those countries. Additionally, it supports opening up the EU market to agricultural products 
from the neighbour countries. 
It appears that Germany may expect support for some of its proposals, especially those 
regarding keeping the balance between the Southern and the Eastern dimensions of the 
European Union’s policy, from some Central European countries, which oppose the relative 
downgrading of the Eastern neighbourhood. 
The European Commission’s proposals
The European Commission, which in the end will be in charge of developing a new concept 
for the ENP (although its final version is likely to be influenced strongly by the European 
External Action Service), has also presented its stance. Ten EU commissioners outlined 
a future shape of the European Union’s relations with neighbouring countries in an inter-
nal document seen by Europolitics4. According to them, mutual relations should gradually 
become similar to the model of the Euro-
pean Economic Area existing between the 
EU member states and Norway, Iceland 
and Liechtenstein. This means that the 
EU and the neighbouring countries should 
create a deep and comprehensive free tra-
de area, which – in addition to lifting cu-
stoms duties and quotas in mutual trade 
– envisages that the neighbour countries 
will adjust their internal regulations to the 
standards of the EU single market. However, unlike the European Economic Area, the new 
free trade zone does not provide for any opening up of the EU labour market. Facilitations 
in the movement of people would be limited to the simplification of visa procedures and 
lowering visa fees. The commissioners also want neighbour countries to participate in EU 
programmes, including the Single European Energy Market. These proposals do not go bey-
ond the offer the EU has already presented to its Eastern neighbours launching the Eastern 
Partnership. 
Furthermore, the Commission’s representatives want the EU to strictly observe the prin-
ciples of conditionality and differentiation when granting financial aid to its partners. 
At the same time, they disagree with the allegation made by the Southern member states 
that the allocation of funds to Southern and Eastern neighbours is imbalanced, arguing 
that the amounts of assistance offered to the two regions are almost identical. According 
to calculations made by the European Commission, the value of EU aid offered in 2009 
reached €3.36 per capita in the Southern neighbourhood as a whole and €3.64 per capi-
ta in the Eastern neighbourhood. The Commission also recalled that during the planning 
of financial support as part of the ENP for 2007–2013, the member states made a ‘gentle-
men’s agreement’, according to which one-third of the common funds would be allocated to 
the Eastern neighbourhood and two-thirds to the more populated countries in the Southern 
neighbourhood5. 
The EU Commission disagrees with 
the allegation made by the southern 
member states that the allocation of 
funds to Southern and Eastern ne-
ighbours is imbalanced, arguing that 
the amounts of assistance offered to 
the two regions are almost identical.
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7 http://ec.europa.eu/commis-
sion_2010-2014/president/
news/speeches-statements/
pdf/20110308_en.pdf
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In turn, Janusz Lewandowski, the European Budget commissioner, stated that more funds 
would be allocated for the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument in the 
new financial perspective for 2014–20206. The commissioner admitted that the southern 
member states had pressed the European Commission to increase the funding for the policy 
towards North Africa at the expense of the Eastern direction. 
On 8 March, the Commission published a communiqué envisaging the creation of a ‘Partner-
ship for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean’7. The Com-
mission assumed that since the previous policy, which practically contributed to preserving 
the status quo in the countries of the region, has failed, it must now focus on supporting 
civil society and social reforms. The com-
muniqué includes several new proposals, 
for example the creation of a Civil Socie-
ty Neighbourhood Facility, establishing 
a Social Dialogue Forum (probably mo-
delled on the EaP Civil Society Forum) 
and also improving access to the Internet 
and other communication technologies. 
Nevertheless, most of the Commission’s 
proposals do not go beyond the previous 
plans for reinforcing the EU’s presence in 
this region which the Commission has been preparing over the past few years (and had 
even consulted with North African countries, including the recently overthrown regimes). 
In practice, the EU’s ‘new’ approach to North Africa resembles the offer the EU made as 
part of the Eastern Partnership to Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus. The Europe-
an Commission included the following key proposals in its communiqué:
1. concluding new Association Agreements (modelled on the ‘advanced status’ agreement 
which is currently being negotiated with Morocco) and new free trade agreements, more 
comprehensive than the present ones,
2. facilitating travel to the EU (so-called Mobility Partnerships and visa facilitations), 
3. promoting EU regulations in the Southern neighbourhood countries,
4. establishing a regional energy community (probably modelled on the Energy Community 
which some Balkan and Eastern European countries have joined),
5. increasing the participation of young people from this region in EU educational programmes,
6. supporting the development of rural areas, the development of transport, tourism, etc.
Some of the proposals were presented vaguely. The Commission promised that more deta-
iled plans would be provided in its April communiqué on the ENP. The Commission declared 
that, aside from revising the financial aid priorities, it would also be necessary to increase 
the financial pool of aid for North African countries, in order to make these reforms possible. 
It has thus requested member states to increase the amount of funds which the European 
Investment Bank could allocate to loans in this region. However, the Commission did not 
mention any potential changes in the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instru-
ment. It explained that at the present stage it was still impossible to determine the future 
needs. However, it suggested that additional funds for this region could be allocated as part 
of the so-called Flexibility Instrument and the Emergency Aid Reserve. 
Most of the proposals in the new com-
muniqué on the Partnership for Demo-
cracy do not go beyond the previous 
plans for reinforcing the EU’s presence 
in North Africa, which the Commission 
has been preparing over the past few 
years, and had even consulted with 
the recently overthrown regimes. 
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119435.pdf
9 Statement by Poland’s deputy 
foreign minister, Mikołaj 
Dowgielewicz, Europolitics, 
23 February 2011
If the European Commission starts implementing the ideas presented in the communiqué 
on the new Partnership, the attention of the EU’s executives and a significant bureaucratic 
effort will be directed towards the South. However, it is still uncertain whether these propo-
sals will entail the movement of funds previously allocated for assistance to Eastern Europe 
towards support for North Africa.  
Prospects for further debate
During the Foreign Affairs Council on 21 February no detailed solutions regarding the neigh-
bourhood policy were reached, probably due to disagreements between the member states8. 
The foreign ministers only made a general promise to establish a ‘new type of partnership’ 
between the EU and its southern neighbours. This is likely to be based on agreements simi-
lar to the Association Agreements which 
the EU is presently negotiating with its 
Eastern partners. The Council also pro-
mised support for civil society and young 
people, reinforced with economic co-ope-
ration and “specific political initiatives and 
support packages”. However, it did not 
explain what this assistance would con-
sist of, what its scope would be and which 
funds would be used to provide it. It only 
mentioned that support for the Southern 
neighbourhood would “build on existing 
and relevant programmes”, which means 
that the creation of totally new aid instruments has been ruled out at the present stage. 
This lack of concrete solutions demonstrates the existence of deep divides between the 
member states over the EU’s policy towards the Southern neighbourhood. The southern 
member states have not yet succeeded in pushing through the proposals they included in 
their letter to Lady Ashton. It is certain that Poland9 and Hungary, which currently holds the 
presidency of the EU, oppose it because they do not agree with reinforcing the Southern 
dimension of the EU’s policy at the expense of engagement in the East. Nevertheless, the 
Commission’s communiqué on ‘Partnership for Democracy’ of 8 March is likely to become 
one of the key issues in discussion on a future neighbourhood policy, and will push the 
Eastern Partnership down the agenda. 
Decisions concerning more detailed solutions are likely to be postponed until the Council’s 
meetings in March, or until the announcement of the European Commission’s communiqué 
regarding the European Neighbourhood Policy and its approval by the Council in April. Until 
then, the member states will try to put pressure on the Commission and the European 
External Action Service, which has taken control of the ENP and is likely to play an impor-
tant part in the preparation of the European Commission’s communiqué. 
Implications for EU’s policy towards Eastern neighbours
1. Taking effective measure in North Africa will serves the interests of the European Union 
as a whole. Success in supporting democratic transformation and stabilising the situ-
ation in the region would be desirable per se, and would also make the Eastern neigh-
bours see the European Union as an influential partner. 
The significance of the EU’s challenges in North Africa notwithstanding, shifting funds 
and political engagement from the Eastern to the Southern direction would strongly 
Decisions concerning more detailed 
solutions are likely to be postponed 
until the Council’s meetings in March, 
or until the announcement of the 
European Commission’s communiqué 
on ENP in April. Until then, the mem-
ber states will try to put pressure on the 
Commission and the European External 
Action Service to include their 
suggestions in the communiqué. 
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undermine the effectiveness of the EU’s policy in the East and adversely affect the 
EU’s interests. Among other things, it would impede the conclusion of the Association 
Agreements and Free Trade Agreements, the implementation of which will be expensive. 
One of the consequences of the EU’s reduced engagement in this area would be 
an increase in the activity of other actors, principally Russia. 
2. The proposals put forward by the southern member states reach far beyond the frame-
work of the debate on the future of the ENP, and also concern transferring funds alloca-
ted for other EU foreign policy instruments from the East to the South. Therefore, from 
the point of view of the EU’s policy towards the Eastern partners, it will be important to 
prevent shifts in the funds allocated for the Eastern neighbourhood as part of such EU 
programmes as the Instrument for Stability, the European Instrument for Democracy and 
Human Rights, and the Development Co-operation Instrument. These programmes play 
an important positive role in the EU’s policy towards these countries. 
3. It would be a mistake to take stability in the Eastern neighbourhood for granted, as 
the authors of the letter from the southern member states to Catherine Ashton seem 
to have assumed. Destabilisation of the situation in this region cannot be ruled out 
in the mid- or even short-term perspective, as indicated by the brutal suppression of 
the opposition protests after the presidential election fraud in Belarus on 19 Decem-
ber 2010, increasing tension between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, 
and the mass anti-governmental demonstrations in Armenia in February and March 
2011. In addition, four of the six countries covered by the Eastern Partnership 
(the exceptions being Belarus and Ukraine) are engaged in separatist conflicts, and 
a resumption of military conflicts in those countries cannot be ruled out. 
4. The proposals put forward by the southern member states have met with opposition 
from many other EU members. It appears that the German proposals are more likely to 
attract wider support because they are more moderate, and they do not call into question 
the ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ regarding the distribution of the funds between the South 
and the East. Furthermore, they emphasise the need to observe the principles of diffe-
rentiation and conditionality in the process of granting financial aid, which is required by 
most member states and EU institutions. The German proposals are also more likely to 
be supported by Lady Ashton, who may be interested in giving up the rigid framework 
of ENP financing and creating a reserve of funds to be used according to current needs. 
This would allow Ashton to avoid the situation in which she found herself in during her 
February visit to Tunisia, when she could not offer any funds in addition to those allocated 
four years before. Ashton’s stance will be particularly important because the communiqué 
on the future of the ENP will be developed by EEAS, which reports to her. 
5. In order to reinforce EU neighbourhood policy, it would be better if member states ad-
vocating South and those who advocate East mutually support their initiatives, instead 
of competing with each other. This happened in 2008, when the Central European 
countries accepted the idea of creating the Union for the Mediterranean in exchange 
for France’s support for the Eastern Partnership. If the debate were put back onto such 
a track, the countries interested in the Eastern Partnership could count on backing from 
France, Spain, Greece and other southern EU member states (and vice versa). However, 
it cannot be ruled out that such a solution would be opposed by Germany and by other 
countries (for example, Austria, Denmark and Holland), which are reluctant to increasing 
the ENP budget. 
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The EU's financial assistance programmes in Eastern and Southern neighbourhood
Main EU financial assistance programmes available to the neighbourhood (in euro)
2007–2013
Eastern neighbourhood Southern neighbourhood
European Neighbourhood 
and Partnership Instrument
4 billion 8 billion 
Investment/credit support 
of the European Investment Bank
3.7 billion 8.7 billion
Neighbourhood Investment Facility 700 million
Governance Facility 50 million annually
Thematic instruments 
(also used in other regions worldwide)
Instrument for Stability 1.6 billion
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights 1.1 billion
Instrument for Nuclear Safety Co-operation 524 million
Development Co-operation Instrument
- Investing In People 1 billion
- Environment & Sustainable Management 
of Natural Resources
470 million (2007–2010)
- Food Security 925 million (2007–2010)
- Migration And Asylum 384 million (2007–2013)
- Non-State Actors & Local Authorities in Development 1.6 billion (2007–2013)
A P P e N d i X
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